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Review of Kant, God and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn,  
Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 462 
 
Kant can often seem to have more in common with our secular age than with pre-
enlightenment Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Luther. Think of his denial that we can 
know that God exists, of his rejection of organized religion in his personal life, of the priority 
he gives to human freedom and dignity over any supernatural authority. His philosophy is 
frequently seen as engaging in projects similar to our own, for example in giving an ‘analysis 
of the discursive nature’ of our cognition (Allison) or defending a form of phenomenalism (van 
Cleve). However, more recently some commentators have started to investigate Kant’s 
theological commitments, for example Christopher Insole and Stephen Palmquist. In Kant, God 
and Metaphysics: The Secret Thorn, Edward Kanterian offers a similar approach. He examines 
Kant’s early work, up to around 1770, to demonstrate that Kant was firmly embedded in the 
eighteenth century, and especially in the German, broadly Protestant, philosophy of that age. 
During the period under investigation, Kant was almost obsessed with formulating (a priori 
and a posteriori) proofs for the existence of God. Additionally, before, and even after his so-
called critical turn, Kant adopted a Lutheran ‘motif of weakness’, stressing the limits of man’s 
reason, and conceding that there are some things humans cannot know. Further, Kant is 
repeatedly shown as influenced by Christian thinkers working within a typically Lutheran, 
Protestant or Pietist framework, and replying to thinkers in that tradition. For this reason, 
Kanterian challenges the common assumption that Kant is closer to us than to his own age. 
 
The book consists of seven chapters. Chapter one begins with Erasmus and ends with 
Hume, thereby covering a span of more than 200 years. Here we are introduced to major 
philosophers and theologians prior to Kant, most of whom shared a broadly religious outlook. 
Chapter two deals primarily with Kant’s most important early philosophical works, Universal 
Natural History (1755) and the New Elucidation (1755). The author demonstrates that the 
theological theme is at the centre of Kant’s thought from the outset, since the former book 
offers a wide-ranging teleological proof for the existence of God (using and expanding upon 
Newton’s cosmology), while the second book develops an a priori existence proof, based on 
modal considerations. Chapter three covers Kant’s work just prior to The Only Possible Ground 
in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763). These works deal very much 
with Leibniz and Newton. However, reference is also made to three figures whose relation to 
Kant is less often discussed, namely Pope, Spalding and Crusius. Again, the focus here is with 
Kant’s theological commitments, especially on the question of ‘optimism’ much debated in the 
period, i.e. whether this is the best of all possible worlds, assuming it was created by a 
benevolent God. As it transpires in this chapter, and in fact is defended throughout the book, 
in his early decades Kant was driven by a ‘reconciliation’ project, attempting to develop a 
coherent system uniting Christianity, rational metaphysics and the new physics. Chapter four, 
by far the longest of the book, deals in great detail with The Only Possible Ground. This was, 
as Kanterian writes, ‘the most important, systematic, far-ranging and ambitious of his works 
so far, indeed of anything he was to write prior to the first Critique’. A central topic here is 
Kant’s updated version of his ‘modal argument’ for the existence of God (essentially the claim 
that for there to be possibility at all, something that ‘grounds’ all possibility must exist of 
necessity – God). Kanterian tries to formalize this argument using contemporary modal logic, 
taking, as a point of departure, a similar attempt offered by Allen Wood in 1978. Chapter five 
deals with the doubts Kant soon had not only about his modal argument, but generally also 
about rational theology and metaphysics. The works discussed here primarily concern the 
foundations of knowledge and metaphysics (and the relation of the latter to mathematics), 
rather than focusing specifically on God, as in the prior chapters. In chapter six, Kanterian 
focuses on what he refers to as Kant’s ‘sceptical period’. Kanterian argues here that while ‘from 
1764 onwards, Kant often adopts a sceptical, anti-metaphysical tone’, which finds its 
culmination in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer (1766), he remains nonetheless committed to the 
metaphysico-theological claims of the tradition. This is evidenced by numerous notes in Kant’s 
Nachlass in the 1760–1770s, which Kanterian explores in the seventh chapter, before 
summarizing Kant’s ‘unfinished drama’ in the epilogue. The scholarship of this book is 
impressive. The author discusses almost all of Kant’s texts up to 1770, and many works after 
1770, and interprets numerous passages of the Nachlass and lectures (including texts little 
discussed so far, e.g. Metaphysik Herder). The secondary literature includes many references 
to Kant’s predecessors and contemporaries, and also to Anglophone and German Kant studies 
in the last 100 years.  
 
A recurring theme in this book, and unusual in standard treatments of Kant, is the motif 
of ‘fallenness’ or ‘weakness’, which, the author argues in the first chapter, was a religious 
background assumption framing the thoughts of most thinkers from (at least) Luther to Kant. 
According to Luther, man is a ‘fallen’ creature, and his reason and will are both corrupted. The 
surprising consequence of this is that some of the things Luther says about metaphysics sound 
almost like Kant’s critical verdicts, such as when Luther describes metaphysics as a ‘misguided 
discipline’ and ‘a study of empty illusion’. We cannot, as fallen creatures, hope to know God, 
by appeal to our faulty reasoning. According to Luther, we should do away with futile 
speculation and take a practical turn instead, towards a lived faith. As Kanterian emphasizes, 
however, Luther was not entirely dismissive of reason; he appealed to it in disputes. But, he 
did not think that it is possible or useful to make ‘theoretical sense of the mysteries of salvation 
and of God’. 
 
One of Kanterian’s main claims is that Kant is committed to the weakness motif as 
well. As he tries to show, Kant belonged, intellectually and by formation, to a broadly German-
Protestant tradition of philosophy. He studied at the Pietist ‘Collegium Fridericianum’ in 
Königsberg, where two of his teachers, Schultz and Knutzen, were Pietist theologians. 
According to Kanterian, the ‘young Kant appears to have studied carefully Knutzen’s 
dissertation’, in which ‘the weakness motif arises out of [...] pious humility and the veneration 
of God’s majesty’. There are remarkable analogies between the tone of religious exaltation in 
Knutzen and in the Universal Natural History (and even in the first Critique, cf. B650). Knutzen 
also discusses the problem of the cosmological antinomy, in the context of the contrast between 
God and his finite creation. Moreover, Knutzen was not the only one to combine theology with 
metaphysics. Many other German thinkers to whom Kant was exposed followed this line as 
well, for example Wolff, Baumgarten, Spalding and Crusius, all of whom receive extensive 
treatment in this book. 
 
Even prior to The Only Possible Ground, we see Kant appeal to the motif of weakness. 
Kant’s New Theory of Motion and Rest (1758), in which he argues against the notion of 
absolute rest, is said to ‘tie in’ with the weakness motif. According to Kanterian, ‘this short 
text can be seen as an early attempt to reject the overly confident claims of rationalist 
metaphysics’. Additionally, in the 1762 essay, The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic 
Figures, Kant asserts that: ‘[t]his is the fate of human understanding: either to be brooding and 
fall for spectres, or to snatch at objects much too great and build castles in the air’. As Kanterian 
explains, ‘[t]he former tendency is obsessed with forms and takes them for substances, the 
latter tendency overestimates the limits of our mind and advances claims about what cannot be 
known’. This suggests that the critical turn has its roots in the weakness motif, for the latter 
predisposed Kant to assume that there are things we are too limited to know. His doubts about 
the speculative, ‘overconfident’ arguments of the rationalists, were in part doubts about the 
human condition in general. That he was nevertheless still trying to develop a rational 
metaphysics even during the ‘sceptical’ period (Kanterian cites evidence from the Nachlass) is 
not incompatible with this. Kant was simply caught between two different tendencies of 
humanity, the desire to obtain knowledge about ultimate things versus the nagging doubt about 
our own limits. Around 1770 he finally realized that there are deep reasons preventing us from 
developing rational metaphysics. The author offers a good deal of reasons to show that ‘critical’ 
philosophy has much older roots than commonly assumed, both in Kant’s thinking and that of 
his predecessors. At the very least, we need to guard ourselves against too strict a distinction 
between the ‘pre-critical’ and the ‘critical’ system. 
 
Some possible points of criticism arise with respect to Kanterian’s attempt to formalize 
Kant’s modal argument. First, we may wonder how his general hermeneutic project, i.e. 
locating Kant in his own age, fits with a reconstruction of his arguments by means of conceptual 
tools developed long after Kant. Of course, a possible reply could be that it was Leibniz, on 
whom Kant relies, who laid the foundations of modal logic. Therefore, hermeneutics and 
formalization are just complementary projects. But this may only work, if the formalization of 
Kant’s modal argument is really just a re-articulation of its premises and conclusion, not a 
radical remodelling, that actually changes the proof, its premises and conclusion. And this 
brings us to the second point. For after a long series of attempts to formalize Kant’s argument, 
the author actually concludes on a sceptical note: even the most sophisticated formalization of 
the argument (developed in an appendix) proves something much weaker than intended by 
Kant. Moreover, we are told, formalization might be doomed from the outset, because the 
super-general concepts involved in Kant’s argument, e.g. ‘all predicates’, ‘all possibilities’, 
actually resist formalization. Why then try to press Kant into the straitjacket of our logic at all? 
 
There are many other topics treated in this book, for example Kant’s cosmology, his 
relation to Newton, Leibniz, Rousseau, his early ethics and aesthetics, his account of existence 
and necessity, etc. Its impressive scholarship and thought-provoking claims make this a must-
read for anybody with an interest in Kant, his ideas and his age. 
 
